on the Roumanian Front, converted the Roumanian invasion of Transylvania into an utter defeat. We ask our Allies to examine this proposal in a sympathetic spirit, and, subject to the approval of the Conference, *we propose that orders should be given to our respective General Staffs to work it out in all its technical details, including the elaboration of railway time-tables, and the arrangements for the necessary gun emplacements and communications.**

24. *The second possible contingency is that the Allies themselves should take the offensive in this region.* We consider that the instructions to the *Possibilities* **Allied Staffs should not be limited to** *of an Italian t • r- i i r** *offensive* ^ **provision of a purely defensive** scheme for the Italian Front, as outlined above. We consider that they should be directed to examine also the possibilities of exploiting the offensive possibilities of this front. *We should like to ask the Generals to report to us whether they cannot devise plans for a surprise artillery concentration for offensive purposes on the Isonzo Front.* If our information is correct, the Italian Army has the strength to conduct offensive operations on a great scale on that relatively narrow front, which is suited to a great offensive, and they have also the *infantry* strength to hold a longer line than the present one. We understand that the reason why they have not yet achieved complete success in their splendid offensive is the lack of sufficient artillery, and more

especially heavy artillery and heavy artillery ammunition, to bring about a decisive conclusion. Would it not be possible to make a great and sudden stroke against the enemy by a concentration of

* This preparation for a German-Austrian attack on Italy saved the situation after Caporetto.